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I’m so dizzy, my head is spinning

Wednesday was a busy day. Recovering from Halloween candy-induced sugar shock; Finance Minister income mistrust; client meetings; industry briefings; and, the Canadian Information Productivity Awards. BCE’s 3rd quarter results got lost in shuffle.

The wireless industry held a briefing Wednesday to help the community of analysts better understand the competitive landscape as described in their recently released commissioned reports from Wall Communications: “A Study on the Wireless Environment in Canada” and more catchily entitled “An Examination of Issues Raised in the Telecommunications Policy Review Panel’s March 2006 Report Regarding the Canadian Mobile Wireless Services Industry.”

The Canadian wireless sector has been feeling under attack lately. The CRTC has imposed number portability under a more compressed timetable; it is planning to consider equal access to long distance competition on cellular; consultants like Seabord Group have released studies that suggest Canadians are paying 60% more than equivalent US plans. Seabord says price is a hurdle that holds back Canadians’ adoption of wireless services.

So CWTA released the Wall reports as its rebuttal and had the authors available for Q&A.; While I agree that there are a number of factors that contribute to wireless penetration lagging the US, I am not pursuaded by Wall Communications that our prices are just fine, thank-you.

The Wall report says that Seabord assumed average use of 500 minutes in looking at comparable US plans, which Wall claims is too high. Canadian minutes of use aren’t that high, but the industry numbers include pre-paid, which Wall acknowledged brings the average down. Industry average (pre-paid and post-paid) is closer to 400 minutes per month.

When pressed to give a better post-paid number to allow Seabord to defend its claim, the subject was changed. I note that Rogers’ most recent results indicated that their average post-paid customer generated 541 minutes of use per month for the first 9 months of 2006, up 50 minutes from a year ago. It seems to me that Seabord’s use of 500 was pretty good.

Industry Canada will soon be soliciting comments on rules for its next spectrum auction, including an examination of whether incentives such as a spectrum set-aside should be introduced to attract more facilities based wireless carriers. CWTA will need more convincing evidence to demonstrate that we already have sufficient levels of competition.

Nobody wins on Centrex rate hike decision

Through the summer, we wrote about Bell’s application to raise Centrex rates and the subsequent opposition filed by the Federal government.

On Friday, the CRTC gave final approval to the Bell price increase, rejecting arguments to allow customers out of their contracts in the case that the telephone company initiates the tariff increase.

The Commission said

if the Commission were to direct the Companies, as has been essentially suggested by MTS Allstream, to modify the terms of their Centrex tariffs, and by extension other tariffs, so as to provide customers with the ability to reduce or eliminate their use of a service during the term of a contract period without incurring any penalties, the Commission considers that incentives for the ILECs to continue to make available discounted pricing plans for their customers would be greatly reduced.

This seems disingenuous. According to the CRTC, customers can’t be let out of their contracts when the phone companies raise their prices, because of a fear that ILECs may no longer offer discounts for long term contracts if customers aren’t bound to stick it out. What about the idea that a contract is binding on both parties? What good are discounts if the ILECs get to raise the prices of their own will in the middle of the term?

The ILECs created their own disincentive for customers to sign up to long term contracts, since there is apparently no assurance that the pricing will be maintained. What Allstream sought was for the Commission to permit customers to hold ILECs accountable to offer the committed prices for the duration of the contract period. You would think this wasn’t a novel concept.

Who won in the end? We’ll see if the rate increase was worth the loss of goodwill when these contracts are up for renewal.

Will policy direction make a difference?

The government’s proposed policy direction to the CRTC is being reviewed by the House of Commons in committee today. There are 3 panels appearing – each with 45 minutes: ILECs (Bell, Bell Aliant, TELUS and Sasktel); Cable companies (Rogers, Shaw, Videotron and Cogeco); and, New entrants and the public interest (MTS Allstream, Primus, Cable Systems Alliance, PIAC, Quebec Coalition of ISPs and L’Union des consommateurs).

Interesting groupings, with MTS Allstream not appearing as an ILEC and CCSA not appearing with the other cable companies.

Recall that at The Canadian Telecom Summit last June, Industry Minister Bernier announced a proposed direction to the CRTC that it should rely on market forces above other objectives set out in the Telecom Act.

Darren Entwistle spoke at an Ottawa lunch hosted by the Canadian Chamber of Commerce yesterday, calling for “a regulatory revolution in Canada” to bring changes at the CRTC.

While I support the intent to have regulation migrate to an increased reliance on market forces, I would ask ‘will it make a difference?’ What aspects of which decisions would the CRTC have dealt with differently with this policy direction in place versus the way they ruled?

Do we actually think that the CRTC ignored the potential for an increased reliance on market forces? Is it possible that the CRTC considered whether market forces would be sufficient and decided ‘no’? Will the policy direction change these results?

Take a look at the VoIP reconsideration Decision. In that instance, the Cabinet sent the CRTC’s VoIP Decision back for reconsideration with a specific view to increase the weight of market forces. On September 1, the CRTC came back endorsing its original conclusions [note: Cabinet has until the end of November to decide if the CRTC’s confirmation of its original conclusion is acceptable].

So what will be the difference with the government’s policy direction in place?

If Cabinet wants to end up with specific results on the CRTC’s decisions, then it appears it has to issue specific directions. For that reason, elements of part (c) of the proposed direction will be the most contentious:

(c) in order to promote efficient, informed and timely operations the Commission should adopt the following operational practices:

(i) provide for maximum efficiency in regulation by using only tariff approval measures that are as minimally intrusive and as minimally onerous as possible,

(ii) with a view to providing increased incentives for innovation, investment in and construction of competing telecommunications network facilities, conduct a review of its regulatory framework regarding mandated access to wholesale services, in order to determine the extent to which mandated access to wholesale services that are not essential services should be phased out and the appropriate pricing of mandated services to encourage investment and innovation in network infrastructure,

On a prospective basis, if government wants the CRTC to change its overall approach, then we should be watching for changes to the CRTC and the Telecom Act itself.

There are a number of Commissioners of the CRTC with terms expiring soon. We’ll be watching for a shift in the direction of the CRTC in appointments of the Chair and Commissioners.

Net neutrality and broadcasting

CBCOn Thursday, Michael Geist wrote about the CBC’s submission to the CRTC proceeding examining the future of broadcasting.

He pointed out that CBC raises the issue of Net Neutrality:

The business case analysis for Internet video is complicated by the fact that suppliers of broadband connections may also have incentives to control the bandwidth available for Internet video. Canadian cable companies engage in “bandwidth shaping” which allocates different levels of transmission capacity to different services according to the operational preferences of the cable company. This type of bandwidth shaping can ensure efficient use of transmission capacity. It can also ensure that Internet video by third parties does not become a threat to the business of the cable company, whether it be the delivery of traditional television programming to cable subscribers, VOD or the distribution of cable company-owned Internet video services.

[emphasis in original]

The CRTC has looked at this issue twice in relation to VoIP. In the original 2005 VoIP Decision in 2005, the CRTC said

The Commission considers that it can rely on subsection 27(2) of the Act, where appropriate, to prohibit a Canadian carrier from restricting its broadband customers from dealing with an alternative service provider of the customer’s choice. This issue can therefore be addressed by the Commission on a case-by-case basis, should it arise. Such competitive disputes are likely to be resolved by the Commission in a timely manner, using its expedited procedures.

[P. 475]

In light of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that it would not be appropriate to impose a general obligation on all broadband access providers to unbundle quality of service capabilities that these providers offer to their own customers at this time.

[P. 482]

In its recent reconsideration of the VoIP regulatory regime. the CRTC again declined to create specific Net Neutrality regulations, again citing S. 27(2) of the Telecom Act:

In Decision 2005-28, the Commission considered that it could rely on subsection 27(2) of the Act, where appropriate, to prohibit a Canadian carrier from restricting its broadband customers from dealing with an alternative service provider of the customer’s choice. The Commission also considered that any such issues could be addressed on a case-by-case basis using expedited procedures and denied parties’ requests for the imposition of an access condition.

[P. 132]


Accordingly, the Commission denies the requests of Vonage and Cybersurf to re-examine the need for an access condition at this time.

[P. 134]

In relation to voice service, twice the CRTC looked squarely at whether specific conditions needed to be imposed on facilities-based ISPs. Both times, the CRTC determined that there is already sufficient protection contained within the current regulatory framework.

What is Section 27(2)? It is the Unjust Discrimination provision of the Telecom Act:

No Canadian carrier shall, in relation to the provision of a telecommunications service or the charging of a rate for it, unjustly discriminate or give an undue or unreasonable preference toward any person, including itself, or subject any person to an undue or unreasonable disadvantage.

This provision has seen a lot of action through the years – there are special meanings that we can help you understand for every “un” word.

Will the CRTC reach the same conclusions as it did with VoIP in respect of neutrality provisions for broadcasting over the internet?

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Centrex squeeze play

Bell Canada has applied for a 10% increase in rates for Centrex III service. Bell has asked for the CRTC to approve the tariff increase by today, to be effective September 1.

Bell’s justification for the increase included:

The rates for these components have remained unchanged since 2002 while network investments have continued. In addition, inflation over this same time period was 10.12% as per the Bank of Canada’s statistics.

Bell’s arguments ignore the productivity improvements that would normally be assigned as offsets against the inflation factors – productivity that represent improved capital and operational efficiency.

Bell may be trying to create better financial incentives for customers to migrate to their IP-based Centrex service, MIPT. There must be confidence that customers won’t look at TELUS IP-One and other carrier and customer premises-based solutions. Even customers under contract will see their rates increase: generally, the contracts refer to the tariff.

Centrex-based resellers of local lines are going to be badly hurt by this action. Their contracts likely don’t point to a tariff and therefore the increases will eat into their margins.

There are three ways for Bell to succeed on this filing: unit revenues for Centrex go up 10%; competitors get hurt; and, customers are incented to migrate to Bell’s portfolio of VoIP solutions, some of which may win forbearance under the CRTC’s pending VoIP reconsideration.

Bell only loses if this manoeuvre angers customers sufficiently to have them take look elsewhere.


Update:
The CRTC gave interim approval to the application today.
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