Search Results for: incentives

Following up on Monday’s posting about building broadband networks, I noticed Verizon’s comments to the US government about the American broadband stimulus bill speaks in similar terms to what I have been suggesting.

Verizon observed that 90 percent of U.S. households already have access to broadband, and that of the households that have computers, 80 percent of them subscribe to broadband services.

Verizon is calling for the program to focus on extending broadband connections to unserved areas, and addressing demand-side factors that hamper growth, such as many households still lacking a computer.

Verizon took issue with those seeking to attach regulatory conditions to broadband funding:

In order to ensure that the recovery act’s broadband programs do not get bogged down in regulatory wrangling that would undermine quick job creation and economic stimulus, [the government] also should avoid imposing regulatory ‘strings’ or eligibility criteria that will deter participation or otherwise inhibit sustainable broadband investment and job creation.

In other words, keep net neutrality restrictions off this program. Recall that last month, we wrote about the kinds of strings that some wanted attached to funding.

We have a session called Building Broadband on June 15 at The 2009 Canadian Telecom Summit. On June 16, we have a panel looking at Net Neutrality. Have you registered yet?

Jeffrey Fan, telecom analyst at UBS, has released a report that looks at the impact of new entrants on the Canadian wireless industry. The report is certain to generate substantial discussions, if not heated arguments in the countdown to Industry Canada’s release of the AWS spectrum auction rules.

Among the most significant findings in the report are:

• Videotron and Shaw have positive business cases for wireless, substantial opportunities for Videotron, even without any incentives from the government. In the case of Videotron, UBS estimates that it can afford to pay 3 times the cost of spectrum in the 2001 auction. Shaw could afford to pay almost double the 2001 price.
• MTS Allstream does not have a business case if it has to pay the average price for spectrum from the last auction. It has a negative NPV and very low IRR. “We fail to find the economic rationale for MTS Allstream to expand its wireless operations nationally.” The UBS model shows a negative NPV of $684M for MTS Allstream – which seems to indicate that the present value of new entrant concessions would need to be that high, just to make the business case break even.
• UBS believes foreign carriers will not find Canada’s AWS auction being sufficiently attractive for invest at a minority position.

What would it take to make the MTS Allstream business case go positive?

To make it viable, we believe MTS would want: 1) little cost incurred for the spectrum licences; and, 2) to build out less than two-thirds of the sites that would typically be required.

UBS raised its target for MTS Allstream last Wednesday, however the new paper discusses a number of factors that could impair MTS Allstream’s success. Among them:

• the company’s ideal customers are seen as a challenge for a wireless business plan since the business services market is already mature;
• business clients would be most demanding on roaming capabilities which would be costly until the national network is largely built;
• the success in developing domestic and international partnerships is not likely; and,
• external capital will be required, given the current dividend stream.

We can expect considerable discussion of this paper, which also quantifies changes in stock market valuations taking into account the potential impact of additional wireless players.

A couple of weeks ago, I saw two articles by academics writing in the Hill Times, each looking at rural broadband solutions. Each presented a different perspective.

In “Tackling the ‘wicked’ rural broadband gap”, by Professor Gregory Taylor of University of Calgary, the subtitle says: “Policymakers must resist the temptation to throw up their arms in frustration, or—worse—leave the entire problem to the whims of Elon Musk.”

“Towards a new Canadian broadband future?” was written by Professor Erik Bohlin, the Ivey Chair in Telecommunication Economics, Policy, and Regulation at Ivey Business School at Western University. The subtitle on his article reads “We will need to face the reality that the fundamental competition now is not primarily between the telecom carriers, but with other value systems.”

Professor Bohlin writes about “Canada’s lagging productivity and weak investment climate, especially around broadband infrastructure, which provides a foundation for a thriving digital economy… Long-standing gaps with the United States in both labour productivity, and information and communications technology investments have been identified by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development”

In the past two months, we have seen two major corporate transactions among Canadian telecom operators. Bell announced a $5B acquisition of US-based Ziply Fiber. adding 1.3M addresses to its fibre footprint. Rogers invested $4.7B to take majority control of Maple Leaf Sports and Entertainment. Each deal represents investment in businesses that are independent of Canada’s telecom policy framework.

Earlier this month, the UK moved closer to approving the merger of mobile operators, Three and Vodafone. The Competition and Markets Authority set out a remedy package that would permit the deal to go through, taking the UK down to 3 carriers in a market with 93 million mobile subscribers in a land area a quarter the size of Ontario.

My immediate reaction to the Bell transaction was that this is another indictment of Canada’s telecom regulatory and policy framework. I wasn’t alone with this line of thinking. TD Securities wrote “Having some diversification into the U.S. could be useful if Canadian market conditions do not improve, and we like the flexibility to allocate less capex to Canada and more to the U.S. if future government/regulatory policies do not reward investment in Canada.”

Professor Bohlin points to the CRTC’s mandated wholesale access to fibre networks as “pivotal for investment incentives.” He notes that for 25 years, the European Union “followed a primary emphasis on mandated access in telecoms, and has lower rates.” The EU identified a telecom investment gap in the order of 200-billion euros required to achieve connectivity targets for 2030. An EU white paper [pdf, 555KB] calls for an increased focus on investment incentives for advanced communications infrastructure.

Incentives to invest is a common theme on this blog. Professor Bohlin calls for “increased dialogue between industry and government about the fundamental objectives for developing a strong, viable Canada, and the enabling role that telecom infrastructure may play in achieving that vision”.

I read the Taylor piece with a more critical eye, given that he erroneously states “most telephone service of the 20th century was provided by public provincial, and, in some cases, municipal services — MTS, SaskTel, Alberta Government Telephones, Edmonton Telephone, and BC Tel — which had to step in when the private sector came up short.” (One of those companies – BC Tel – is not like the others.)

Professor Taylor’s article complains about the number of rural Canadians who still lack access to broadband services that meet the CRTC’s national objective.

It has been eight years since the CRTC made the bold 2016 objective that “Canadians in urban, rural, and remote areas can access affordable, high-quality telecommunications services,” and set 50 megabits per second (Mbps) download and 10 Mbps upload as the ambitious targets to qualify as the required speeds. That audacious goal doubled the 2015 Federal Communications Commission (FCC) target when the American regulator set benchmark speeds at 25/3 Mbps. However, this once-bold policy stand is starting to look increasingly timid in 2024. In its recent 2024 Broadband Deployment Report, the FCC raised its fixed speed benchmark for broadband to 100 Mbps download and 20 Mbps upload.

I have written before that when some Canadians are wanting for any kind of affordable broadband, it takes a measure of arrogance to proclaim that 50 Mbps isn’t good enough.

The latest CRTC’s data is nearly two years old. At year-end 2022, 93.1% of Canadians had access to broadband exceeding the objective. That blended average is composed of 99.4% urban and 67.4% rural. So the focus on rural connectivity is understandable. Still, it is unclear why Professor Taylor used even older 2021 data in his article, saying that only 62% of rural households had access to the broadband objective. We can see a significant improvement was made between 2021 and 2022, growing from 62% to 67.4%. More work needs to be done, but 5.4% represents more than 350,000 people, a substantial achievement.

In the coming weeks, I am working on a post that takes an in-depth look at technology adoption and affordability. Watch for it on these pages

Professor Taylor’s article concludes with a reference to wholesale access to fibre networks, somehow seeing increased competition as a regulatory initiative promoting investment. The CRTC itself recognizes the deleterious impact of mandated access on investment incentives and its decisions attempt to mitigate those concerns.

A few years ago, I wrote “Isn’t some broadband better than nothing?”. For people without access, the best rural broadband solutions are the ones that can be delivered now. Three years ago, I wrote, “Le mieux est le mortel ennemi du bien.”

In developing rural broadband expansion, it is impractical to restrict solutions to universal fibre access. It is better to get some broadband service to unserved areas rather than wait for so-called future-proof connectivity.

We can’t wait for a perfect solution for broadband for all Canadians. But we can strive to do a lot more, a lot better, and a lot sooner.

That means improving the conditions that promote investment in advanced digital infrastructure.

As I was marking these days of reflection in the Jewish calendar, I found myself asking, where is the vision for Canada’s national digital strategy?

Sure, there is a Digital Charter, a pronouncement heavy on market intervention, following the tradition theme of “Tax it, regulate it, subsidize it”. But, the Digital Charter is light on how we drive increased national productivity. Where is the strategic vision?

When I look at the official mandate for the responsible federal agency, I read “Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada’s (ISED) mission is to foster a growing, competitive and knowledge-based Canadian economy.” The department says its “raison d’être” is to work “with Canadians in all areas of the economy and in all parts of the country to improve conditions for investment, enhance Canada’s innovation performance, increase Canada’s share of global trade, and build a fair, efficient and competitive marketplace.”

It sounds good so far, but what is the strategy to achieve these bold objectives? It is somewhat trite to say that the department’s “raison d’être” – its very reason for being – is to improve investment conditions, enhance innovation performance, and build a fair, efficient and competitive marketplace.

How does the department plan to do that? Indeed, considering the current government has been in power for 9 years, how did the department plan to do that? Where is the strategy that has been guiding them?

Regulation in the absence of an overall strategic vision can be harmful. In rejecting Senate Bill 1047, the AI safety legislation, California Governor Gavin Newsom wrote: “Given the stakes – protecting against actual threats without unnecessarily thwarting the promise of this technology to advance the public good – we must get this right.” Arguments were made that the provisions of SB 1047 are too broad and could stifle innovation, and could hinder AI’s development itself.

I took a look at ISED’s Plans and Reports web page. There is a link to a “Science and Technology Strategy” and another link to “Canada’s S&T strategy”. The “Science and Technology Strategy” page is now archived. It dates back to the 2007, when the Conservatives were in power. The “Canada’s S&T strategy” also dates back to the Conservative era, publishing a report in 2014 (“Seizing Canada’s Moment: Moving Forward in Science, Technology and Innovation 2014”), and launching a consultation (“Developing a Digital Research Infrastructure Strategy”). The Digital Charter sets out 10 principles. Are we doing enough to tie these to the departmental raison d’être, to “improve investment conditions, enhance innovation performance, and build a fair, efficient and competitive marketplace.”

A lot of these government consultations produce reports that sit on shelves. But, isn’t it helpful to have a somewhat official strategy point of reference to guide the development of more specific objectives and tactics? When handing out billions of dollars in government subsidies, shouldn’t the Minister be able to point to a strategy document to justify certain priorities over others?

This isn’t the first time that I have come back from Rosh Hashana with broad policy reflections. Three years ago, I wrote “How did we get here? How do we move forward?” and wrote:

So, how did we get here?

A number of years ago, in “Digging ditches and digital policy”, I cited a paper from the Institute for Research in Public Policy that said “Like other countries, Canada is once again engaging actively and more openly in industrial policy. In fact, it has a profusion of industrial policies, what it lacks is a strategy.”

No clear strategy. No clear objectives. No scorecard for measuring progress.

What are we trying to accomplish? How do we measure success? As I have said many times [here and here], I would like to see us start with clear objectives: “Set clear objectives. Align activities with the achievement of those objectives. Stop doing things that are contrary to the objectives.”

How do we celebrate success in digital policy, if we aren’t clear about what we are trying to do?

How do we move forward?

If we want to create appropriate incentives for private sector investment, we can’t keep changing the rules (see: Calvinball). A recent essay on The Hub asks “what incentives do firms have to incur the risk and costs of investment in new network infrastructure if the government can later unilaterally grant access to their competitors at rates determined by regulators?” As the authors write, “The goal should be to create the conditions for investment, innovation, and technological development rather than micromanage the market to produce a particular number of market participants.”

Set clear objectives. Align activities with the achievement of those objectives. Stop doing things that are contrary to those objectives.

A few weeks ago, I wrote about competing visions for a digital future being laid out in the US. Where is the competing vision from His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition, Canada’s apparent government-in-waiting?

At some point, the Opposition Critics have become known as Shadow Ministers. Being a critic is important in a Westminister-style government. It is their role to hold the Minister to account. But, it is a lot easier to criticize than to develop policy and strategies from scratch. A Canadian election is coming at some point in the next year, and all signs point to a Conservative majority. Casting stones is a lot easier than gathering them together to build something. It’s even harder to build something that will endure.

For the past 9 years in opposition, we have heard what the Conservatives won’t do. It is time to transition from critics to leadership. Where is the vision for Canada’s digital future?

“Delivering on the Copper Decommissioning Promise” is the title of a recent Scotiabank report, issued as part of its Converging Networks 2.0 series. Frequent readers know that I have often cited Scotiabank research. I thought the bank’s September 13 report merits highlighting.

North American incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) have been aggressively deploying fiber within their territories over the last decade. These upgrades have delivered sizable improvements in market share, churn, average revenue per user (ARPU), and cost to serve. Canadian ILECs have been more aggressive than their US peers in rolling out fiber; hence, they have been able to deliver stronger wireline metrics. But what about the “holy grail” of copper decommissioning? TELUS Corporation is the most advanced on the copper decommissioning path within our coverage. Why is this relevant to investors, and when should we begin to bake value upside into these names? In this report, we explore some of the regulatory differences between the United States and Canada related to copper decommissioning and provide an update on fiber rollout and decommissioning plans for companies under our coverage. Bottom line, we believe regulators should encourage ILECs to decommission copper while also making sure to protect vulnerable customers. Fulfilling the copper decommissioning promise will provide additional incentives for ILECs to invest in network upgrades down the road.

As this paragraph notes, Canadian phone companies have been more aggressive than their US counterparts in deploying fibre. Scotiabank estimates that fibre represents about 60-65% of the Bell and TELUS total footprint, while Verizon is about 60%, Frontier is approximately 47% and AT&T has the lowest percentage, despite covering close to 28 million of its premises.

The copper migration by TELUS is seen as enabling monetization of the scrapped copper cables, as well as permitting redevelopment of real estate as central offices are converted. “The saved space inside COs is being rented to cloud companies to install servers.”

Of course, this raises the question of how regulators view the network evolution to fibre. In the US, the FCC has had rules in place for nearly a decade. The US regulator has a web-page describing how technology transitions could affect consumer services. In Canada, the CRTC has indicated “it will shortly address issues related to decommissioning practices through further process.” In its wholesale broadband decision last month, the CRTC added “In the interim, to ensure that consumers are not negatively affected, parties are expected to avoid instances where competitors could lose access to higher-speed aggregated HSA. Should such situations arise, the Commission is prepared to address them expeditiously on a case-by-case basis.”

Scotiabank said “We believe it will be important for the CRTC to not impede ILECs’ copper decommissioning initiatives, especially now that fibre to the home (FTTH) wholesaling will be regulated, while at the same time enforcing measures to safeguard users who need access to 911 services in case of power outages.”

Scotiabank noted two primary concerns with copper decommissioning: reduced competitive choice; and, emergency phone access during a power loss. Solutions exist to mitigate against each of these. The CRTC’s Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2024-180: Competition in Canada’s Internet service markets, addresses the risk of reduced competitive choice by mandating fibre resale. Battery backup provides an option for emergency access, where customers do not have alternate means to call during a power outage.

The CRTC has a very full calendar of activities, so it is difficult to forecast the timing of a regulatory review of copper decommissioning policies. I’ll leave the topic with this caution from the Scotiabank report. “We understand why putting some guardrails in place for copper decommissioning is important; however, we hope that this review does not lead to a heavy-handed regulatory decision that would curtail ILECs’ drive to decommission their copper.”