Commissioner Claire Anderson wrote a lengthy dissent last year as I documented at the time. Commissioner Bram Abramson has written a number of dissenting opinions, perhaps aspiring to challenge former Commissioner Stuart Langford’s record. The Abramson dissents frequently address important legal fine points, dealing with procedural issues and fairness.
Today’s post is intended to highlight the number of dissenting views in the CRTC decisions released so far this week.
Broadcasting Decision CRTC 2026-71: TV5/UNIS TV – Application to increase the mandatory per subscriber monthly wholesale rates
“A joint dissenting opinion by Commissioners Ellen C. Desmond, K. C., and Stéphanie Paquette is attached to this decision.”
Broadcasting Decision CRTC 2026-74: Rogers Communications Inc.’s contributions to the Shaw Rocket Fund
“Dissenting opinions from Commissioners Bram Abramson and Ellen C. Desmond, K.C. are attached to this decision.”
These documents were released by the CRTC in just two days: April 22 and 23. Are these releases demonstrating an inability to reach a consensus with the Commission?
I expect to be writing more about the substance of some of these dissenting views. For now, I simply want to highlight an unusual pattern of dissent.
If there was a single message to be found in Rogers’ Q1 2026 earnings call, it was about the new math for capital investment. Certainly, we heard about subscriber loading, ARPU pressure, and Rogers’ aggressive moves to surface value from sports assets. But the key takeaway was capital. More specifically, how regulatory decisions are reshaping the return profile of telecom capital investment in Canada, and how operators are recalibrating in response.
That’s a theme you have read before on these pages.
Rogers’ announcement [pdf, 167KB] of a 30% reduction in capital spending for 2026, bringing CapEx guidance to the $2.5–$2.7B range, is more than a one‑year belt‑tightening exercise. Management stated this is the new run‑rate. Capital intensity is expected to fall to roughly 12%. “We anticipate this lower level of capex spending will continue for the foreseeable future”. That is a structural shift, not a cyclical one.
The rationale is equally structural. The company pointed repeatedly to a “punitive regulatory environment” that “increasingly disincentivizes capital investments” weakening the economics of long‑term network investment. Policies enabling broad, low‑barrier access to incumbent networks — particularly the MVNO framework extending to 2030 — were cited as eroding the incentive to deploy risk capital. When wholesale access is priced below what operators view as sustainable cost recovery, the business case for marginal builds becomes harder to justify.
This level of capital spending reduction goes far beyond rhetoric. Rogers outlined three concrete drivers behind its CapEx pullback:
Project cancellations where the economics no longer clear under current regulatory and competitive conditions.
Capital efficiency gains, which every operator pursues but which now carry more weight in a low‑growth environment.
Deferrals, stretching multi‑year projects over longer timelines to match slower revenue growth and lower expected returns.
The message to policymakers should now be unmistakable. Despite government statements seeking private sector investment, the current regulatory environment has created conditions that discourage it. The returns on investment simply aren’t there. So, capital will flow elsewhere — or simply not flow at all.
The competitive backdrop amplifies the issue. Rogers described Q1 as a period of “irrational” discounting, with promotional pricing in some segments falling below cost. In a market where ARPU is declining and subscriber growth is driven more by supply‑side promotions than organic demand, the payback period for network investment lengthens. When regulatory policy simultaneously compresses wholesale margins, the combined effect is a materially lower return on capital investment.
Until that equation changes, there is no reason to doubt Rogers statement that the CapEx reduction is not a deferral that will snap back next year. I recently noted a “quantitative evidence of a pull-back in telecom investment” with the 10% reductions in capital between 2022 and 2024. Rogers first quarter 2026 results confirms there is a recalibration of Canada’s investment model underway, reflecting a sector with slower revenue growth, lower ARPU expectations, and regulatory headwinds diluting the value of incremental build‑outs.
The broader implication for Canada’s telecom landscape is that policy choices have consequences, and these are now showing up directly in capital allocation decisions. A sector that once invested $12B over three years is signalling that the next three will look very different.
In his comments at the Rogers 2026 Annual General Meeting, CEO Tony Staffieri said “We operate in a capital-intensive sector, a sector that requires long-term investment cycles and regulatory policy that supports them.” For an industry built on long‑cycle infrastructure, the regulatory environment doesn’t just shape competition — it shapes the network Canadians will have a decade from now.
The capital math has changed. Unless policy shifts with it, investment will follow the new logic.
I think it’s time to consider revisiting the CRTC’s Wireless Code. Indeed, it is past time to have such a review.
The Wireless Code is a mandatory code of conduct setting out rights for consumers of retail mobile wireless voice and data services, and defining obligations for providers of such services.
For more than a dozen years, the Wireless Code has served as the CRTC’s primary consumer‑protection framework for mobile services. However, it was created in a different era — before unlimited plans were common, before international roaming plans were widely available, before 5G, before eSIMs, before device financing innovations became the norm, and before wireless competition intensified across nearly every region of the country. Yet despite the pace of change in the marketplace, the Code itself has barely evolved, having last been tweaked nearly 9 years ago.
That wouldn’t be a problem if the Code were still aligned with how Canadians actually buy and use wireless services. But increasingly, it isn’t.
There were a number of populist-driven consumer measures ordered by Parliament in the 2024 Budget, as I described in a post last month. That legislation gave rise to a “trilogy” of CRTC Notices of Consultation: 2024-293 (Enhancing customer notification); 2024-294 (Removing barriers to switching plans); and, 2024-295 (Enhancing self-service mechanisms).
We now have device financing structures that didn’t exist when the Code was drafted, developed to provide relief from high monthly payments driven by regulated 24-month limit to amortize the cost of devices selling for thousands of dollars. We have multi‑line family plans, data‑sharing pools, and promotional pricing models that don’t map neatly onto the Code’s original assumptions. We have eSIM‑based switching that should make mobility easier, but is often slowed by legacy processes. We have a marketplace where competition is driving prices down, but the regulatory framework hasn’t kept pace with how consumers interact with their service providers.
At the same time, the CRTC’s own processes have slowed to the point where even minor clarifications can take months or years. As I’ve written before, regulatory delay has become a structural issue. When the regulator takes years to update rules that govern a sector evolving in real time, the result is predictable: uncertainty for carriers, confusion for consumers, and a framework that gradually loses relevance.
The Wireless Code is showing its age. Complaints to the CCTS increasingly involve issues the Code never contemplated — device financing disputes, promotional plan expiries, eSIM transfers, the complexities of multi‑line accounts. These are becoming the mainstream of today’s wireless market.
A holistic review is overdue.
A modern Wireless Code should reflect how Canadians actually use and shop for wireless services today, not how they used them in 2013. It should provide clarity for consumers and predictability for services providers. And, it should be developed through a process that is timely, evidence‑based, and focused on outcomes.
This isn’t about adding or deleting rules. It may mean simplifying or clarifying existing ones. But the starting point has to be a recognition that the marketplace has changed — dramatically — and the Code has not.
The CRTC needs to ensure its flagship consumer framework remains fit for purpose. That requires a full review of the Wireless Code, grounded in data, informed by actual consumer behaviour, and conducted with a sense of urgency that has been missing.
Canada’s wireless market has evolved. The rules governing it should too.
I have been a long-time supporter of these webinars to keep up with new trends and issues arising from emerging technology.
The future of space is being shaped by innovators and regulators. The commercial space industry is experiencing unprecedented growth with Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) constellations enabling breakthrough applications. Satellite-based data centers with AI services are on the horizon; direct-to-cellular networks, and earth stations in motion, are expanding what is possible beyond earth.
Laws and regulations governing commercial activities in space have evolved significantly, with today’s regulatory landscape reflecting both established principles and emerging frameworks designed to support these new technologies. From debris management to liability standards to jurisdictional questions, the rules governing space are more relevant than ever and raise fundamental questions:
How should space law evolve to support innovation while maintaining safety?
How should regulators address emerging technologies and business models that existing frameworks weren’t designed to accommodate?
How do we launch one million satellites into earth’s orbit? What are the consequences?
Professor Rob Frieden of Penn State University will discuss how regulations can support next-generation LEO/MEO applications, sharing insights into the rapid evolution of the commercial space sector. The session will explore international and domestic policies shaping space law and examine how emerging frameworks are enabling today’s most exciting developments.
There will be an interactive Q&A session following the talk.
Coincidentally, at the FCC’s April Open Meeting, also scheduled for April 30, there is an agenda item for Space Spectrum Sharing. According to Scotiabank, this “could provide LEO operators with benefits to better serve rural and edge-of-footprint suburban areas.”
Register now for this one-hour session, to explore the high-stakes legal landscape of space — where the next frontier isn’t just technological but regulatory.
I thought the 39-page Statement by the UK regulator deserved a more serious look, especially in view of a sharp contrast with Canada’s regulatory posture, as set out in its 2024 Telecom Regulatory Policy: “Competition in Canada’s Internet service markets.”
Like the UK and many countries, Canada has set a political objective to extend high-speed broadband service to rural and remote regions. Of course, what the UK considers rural and remote is very different from the challenges faced by Canadian carriers. Officially, Canada defines rural as “areas [that] have populations of less than 1,000, or fewer than 400 people per square kilometre.” Roughly 20% of Canadians live in rural Canada. The UK government defines areas as rural if they fall outside of settlements with more than 10,000 resident population. In Canada’s Far North, we have a population density of just 0.02 per square kilometre. Although the definitions differ, roughly 20% of the population of the UK and Canada live in rural areas.
By the end of 2024, the CRTC shows 90.6% of Canadian households had access to gigabit broadband; Ofcom shows 87% of UK premises by mid-year 2025.
In their policy documents, there are similar opening statements by Canada’s CRTC and the UK regulator, Ofcom:
CRTC: “the Commission is working to increase competition while ensuring continued investments in high-quality networks.”
Ofcom: “Our regulation is designed to promote competition and investment in high quality gigabit-capable networks – bringing faster, better broadband to people across the UK.”
The UK’s approach, as laid out in Ofcom’s statement, is an endorsement of facilities‑based competition, with regulations mandating access to passive infrastructure (eg. ducts and poles). Canada used to operate under the premise that facilities-based competition is the most sustainable form; in recent years the CRTC decided to experiment with a hybrid approach, seeking to ensure its wholesale framework “provides equitable regulatory treatment” (as it describes in TRP 2024-180). The divergence is more than just philosophical; it is producing different market structures, and different investment incentives. Canada’s ‘top-down’ regulated wholesale-access policy is applied on wireline and wireless, in sharp contrast to the market-led approach in many other jurisdictions.
In its Policy determination, the CRTC said “Consumers have fewer choices when buying Internet services: in recent years, competition has been declining. By the end of 2022, independent ISPs served significantly fewer customers than they did at the start of 2020. At the same time, several of the largest independent ISPs have been purchased by incumbents.”
This formed part of the rationale for the CRTC’s shift. But there are some strange disconnects in the Commission’s logic. “These facts suggest that the Commission’s prior regulatory approach, which prioritized facilities-based competition, has not brought about sustainable competition that delivers more choice and more affordable services to Canadians, nor has it resulted in universal access to higher-speed Internet services.”
There were two different concepts there. On the first, I would actually argue that there had been greater competitive intensity today among the facilities-based service providers, as evidenced by levels of investment, lower prices, and marketplace rivalry. The fact that independent ISPs – those depending on wholesale access – hold a diminishing share of the market should have been expected as a confirmation that facilities-based service providers were always seen as the most sustainable.
What did the Commission think was meant by sustainable competition? The level of competition should never have been measured by the number of competitors.
As to the second concept (universal access to higher-speed Internet services), coverage cannot be extended by way of wholesale access. Extending coverage requires construction of new facilities, which would seem to imply the need to focus on promoting investment.
The CRTC noted that it had received evidence that “demonstrated how [a decision to mandate wholesale access] could decrease network upgrades and prevent future network deployment. The Commission recognizes that regulatory measures that reduce the incumbents’ revenues can challenge the business case for the incumbents to deploy networks.”
So, the CRTC set up a 5-year “head start” provision as an incentive for telephone companies to extend the reach of their fibre networks. “While the Commission notes that its rate-setting process is designed to be compensatory, it considers that a five-year head start would provide additional incentive for the incumbents to invest in areas where they have not yet built FTTP by giving them an opportunity to more rapidly recoup their initial investments.” At the same time, the CRTC excused cable companies from the obligation to wholesale its fibre, since it only has about 5% of homes with fibre to the premises (as contrasted with 60% of telephone companies).
As it turns out, that 5-year head start isn’t proving to be enough of an incentive. Over the past couple of months, I have written frequently [such as here and here] that capital expenditures are down, measurably down, with carriers pointing blame at the CRTC framework. The Commission’s own monitoring report shows annual drops in capital spending in 2023 and 2024 since levels peaked in 2022. Public company reports are pointing to nearly 10% lower capex in 2025, and projections to fall another 15% lower in 2026.
That should be no surprise to the Commission. The CRTC was warned, as it acknowledged in the Policy determination at ¶34: “The incumbents submitted that a Commission decision to mandate aggregated HSA is likely to reduce investment in high-speed networks.”
Investment impacts quality and coverage – factors that are important for consumers. Contrast sharply falling investment in Canada with Ookla’s latest report on the US market, “Aggressive U.S. Broadband Expansion in 2H2025 Narrows Digital Divide”. “The U.S. broadband landscape underwent a big shift in the latter half of 2025. Thanks to record-breaking new fiber builds, the aggressive expansion of SpaceX’s Starlink, and the growth in fixed wireless access (FWA), broadband availability achieved some new milestones.”
The Commission’s decision to exempt cable companies from mandated fibre wholesale due to low share might also serve as a disincentive for cable companies to invest in fibre. In the Policy, the CRTC said that it was excusing cable from mandated fibre wholesale because the cable companies had such a low percentage of premises with fibre: “by the end of 2022, the cable carriers’ FTTP reached just 5% of the homes they pass nationally, compared to over 60% for the ILECs… Mandating the cable carriers to provide aggregated FTTP services would be costly to implement relative to the benefits it may bring to Canadians. It may also result in a loss of cable carriers investment.”
The Commission warned, “A significant increase in the percentage of homes passed by the cable carriers’ FTTP may prompt a Commission review of whether the cable carriers should begin providing aggregated FTTP services.” This was very strange wording in my view – effectively threatening increased regulation if the cable companies invest too much in fibre.
In his speech at the Scotiabank TMT Investor Conference, CRTC Vice Chair Adam Scott described the Commission’s decision-making process as “we take the evidence on the record and use it to form a regulatory hypothesis — that by taking a certain course, we will see a certain type of outcome.”
In the case of capital investment levels arising from its fibre wholesale policy, the CRTC is clearly not seeing its anticipated outcome. How should the Commission respond?
I noticed an interesting phrasing in the Ofcom document with respect to capital expenditures: “We also recognised that the long-term nature of network investments requires regulatory stability and therefore set expectations about future regulation to 2031 and beyond.”
No one wants to see a return to Canada’s Calvinball approach to regulation. “The only permanent rule in Calvinball is that you can’t play it the same way twice.”
If we want to create appropriate incentives for private sector investment in telecom, we can’t keep changing the rules. But first, we need rules that actually encourage investment.
