Spectrum policy in the race for 5G
Canadian spectrum policy will be taking a high profile this year as the government and industry prepare for the increased bandwidth requirements for 5G deployments.
In December, I wrote “Spectrum policy and auctions”, providing links to the videos and presentations from November’s Spectrum Policy workshop held in Ottawa by the International Telecommunications Society.
This past Thursday, Telecom Review magazine released a special report “Spectrum and regulatory policy in the Race for 5G”, examining what various countries around the world are doing to deliver 5G services. The report concludes with “an urgent plea to the politicians and regulators, if you do not allocate sufficient spectrum to the various operators, then you have delivered 4G and underserved your nation in this global 5G race.”
In the article, Italy is identified as an example of what not to do in releasing 5G spectrum:
Italy in our opinion offers a perfect example of what a regulator ought not to do. Italy’s communication regulator, AGCOM, has set its near-term 5G future up for failure in two ways. First, by offering incumbent fixed licensees a six-year extension of their 200 MHz licenses (in the 3400-3600 MHz band) originally set to expire in 2023, Italy limited itself to only being able to auction 200 MHz of spectrum in its 2018 auction, split among four players. Compounding this shortage was a globally recognized poor auction design which split the 200 MHz into two blocks of 80 MHz and two blocks of 20 MHz (with a 100 MHz cap). In doing so, Italy forced its bidders to fight desperately for an 80 MHz block, leading to exorbitant auction prices and a distribution of spectrum that only supports true 5G deployment on two networks.
Unfortunately, the article continues, saying “In North America, Canada appears set to follow Italy’s example”.
By way of contrast, the article highlights the way some regulators are moving away from auctions, favouring a direct assignment of spectrum.
In April 2019 Japan assigned 100 MHz each to four operators (including a new entrant) based on coverage and investment commitments. Similarly, in the UAE two operators were allocated 200 MHz each with potential plans of making an additional 100MHz available.
ARCEP, the French regulator, has proposed to allocate up to four 50 MHz blocks in exchange for a series of “optional commitments”, and the remainder of the 310 MHz band would be allocated in a traditional auction.
If a hybrid approach like France was tried here, what kinds of potential commitments might be sought by the government in exchange for spectrum?
In September, I wrote “The cost of spectrum policy” and I warned “There is a cost associated with spectrum policy, not all of which is financial. As Canada moves forward with development of auction policy for the next wave of spectrum, it is critical to consider the potential for unintended consequences to have significant impact on consumers.”
The mandate letter for Minister Bains already contains a clause on spectrum set-asides that appears to pre-determine a portion of what normally follows a public consultation: “Award spectrum access based on commitments towards consumer choice, affordability and broad access. You will also reserve space for new entrants.”
If Italy offers a perfect example of what a regulator ought not to do, then Canada should be concerned when an international report warns that “Canada appears set to follow Italy’s example.”
It bears repeating: There is a cost associated with spectrum policy, not all of which is financial.

