Who decides? Scotiabank on telecom transactions

Maher Yaghi of Scotiabank issued a report this morning entitled “Who Decides, What They Test, and Implications for Quebecor/TELUS/BCE”. With his permission, I am providing the “Key Points” section of his report. For the complete report, speak to your financial advisor.

KEY POINTS
No single merger regulator; separate gates. A large telecom deal goes through separate federal reviews that run in parallel but are not dependent on one another. The Competition Bureau investigates under the Competition Act, and the Competition Tribunal decides contested cases. The Minister of Industry, through ISED, approves spectrum license transfers under the Radiocommunication Act. The CRTC approves changes in control of broadcasting licenses under the Broadcasting Act. The Investment Canada Act applies when the buyer is non-Canadian. Corporate and securities steps (board, shareholder, court and exchange approvals) run alongside these reviews.

Each body applies a different test, and clearance from one does not bind another. The Bureau asks whether the deal is likely to substantially lessen or prevent competition. ISED looks at how scarce spectrum is allocated and at the ability of competitors to compete. The CRTC applies the broadcasting public interest and Canadian ownership rules. Rogers/Shaw showed a deal can win before the Tribunal and still depend on a spectrum decision from the Minister.

Spectrum is the first hurdle. ISED’s 2023 moratorium prevents it from considering large transfers by major licensees, and the October 2026 Telecom Competition Roadmap did not lift it. Quebecor itself acknowledged this. Until a revised framework is in force, the transaction cannot enter a normal ISED review.

The Competition Bureau rules are tougher now than they were for Rogers/Shaw. The merger efficiencies defense was repealed, and a statutory structural presumption now applies (an HHI increase above 100 combined with post-merger HHI above 1,800 or a combined share above 30%). The remedy standard is stronger and closing is automatically suspended while an injunction application is pending.

Concentration means large divestitures. On our estimates, combined T/QBR wireless shares would be about 51% in Quebec, 52% in Alberta, 45% in B.C. and 31% in Ontario, with HHI increases of +463 to +1,293. That triggers the s.92(2)–(3) presumption in all four provinces. Bringing concentration back onside could require divesting roughly 3.1–3.8 million subscribers.

CRTC is necessary but manageable. TELUS’s licensed BDUs and on-demand services make CRTC prior approval mandatory. Quebecor’s ownership of TVA broadens the review to vertical integration and independent programmers, but we see this track as manageable. On the disclosed structure, QBR.A holders keep a majority of votes, so the buyer remains Canadian and we would not assume any Investment Canada Act review.

Rogers/Shaw is a guide, not a precedent. That deal closed because Freedom was sold to an independent challenger, Videotron. Quebecor/TELUS would instead combine that challenger with an incumbent, reducing Canada from three independent facilities-based wireless networks to two unless remedies preserve an equivalent rival.

Politics are a signal, not an approval, and timing is open-ended. Minister Joly’s statement was two-sided: it promised a rigorous review while stressing resilience and sovereignty. Political sentiment matters most where it becomes formal action, such as a revised spectrum framework or a Governor in Council order. We caution investors not to draw too many conclusions or read too much into statements and TV interviews by ministers or the PM. The Bureau’s work has been protected over the years and over different political mandates from political interference, and we think the biggest gating factor in this proposed merger is the Bureau’s analysis and conclusions.

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